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Abstract
Private set intersection (PSI) is a two party protocol where both parties possess a private
set and at the end of the protocol, one party (client) learns the intersection while other
party (server) learns nothing. Motivated by some interesting practical applications, sev-
eral provably secure and efficient PSI protocols have appeared in the literature in recent
past. Some of the proposed solutions are secure in the honest-but-curious (HbC) model
while the others are secure in the (stronger) malicious model. Security in the latter is tra-
ditionally achieved by following the classical approach of attaching a zero knowledge proof
of knowledge (ZKPoK) (and/or using the so-called cut-and-choose technique). These ap-
proaches prevent the parties from deviating from normal protocol execution, albeit with
significant computational overhead and increased complexity in the security argument,
which includes in case of ZKPoK, knowledge extraction through rewinding.
We critically investigate a subset of the existing protocols. Our study reveals some
interesting points about the so-called provable security guarantee of some of the proposed
solutions. Surprisingly, we point out some gaps in the security argument of several pro-
tocols. We also discuss an attack on a protocol when executed multiple times between
the same client and server. The attack, in fact, indicates some limitation in the existing
security definition of PSI. On the positive side, we show how to correct the security argu-
ment for the above mentioned protocols and show that in the HbC model the security can
be based on some standard computational assumption like RSA and Gap Diffie-Hellman
problem. For a protocol, we give improved version of that protocol and prove security in
the HbC model under standard computational assumption.
For the malicious model, we construct two PSI protocols using deterministic blind
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signatures i.e., Boldyreva’s blind signature and Chaum’s blind signature, which do not in-
volve ZKPoK or cut-and-choose technique. Chaum’s blind signature gives a new protocol
in the RSA setting and Boldyreva’s blind signature gives protocol in gap Diffie-Hellman
setting which is quite similar to an existing protocol but it is efficient and does not involve
ZKPoK.
